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BEYOND TECHNIQUES OF CASE
MANAGEMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
A. LEO LEVIN*
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990' ("CJRA") was accompa-
nied by a Senate Committee Report that begins with the finding
that the federal courts were suffering "under the scourge of two
related and worsening plagues."2 One plague was excessive cost
to the litigants, the other a shortage of judicial resources.3 An om-
nibus judgeship bill, authorizing eighty-five additional Article III
judges, dealt rather directly with the latter problem.4 Containing
the cost of litigation was a far more complex matter. The problem
existed for years, sometimes prompting dire warnings from the
bar.5 Prior attempts at alleviating the situation6 had been, in the
* I had the privilege of serving as Reporter to the Advisory Group of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania appointed under the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. Robert M. Landis served as Chairman and Jennifer
R. Clarke as Assistant to the Chairman. The three of us spent many hours together
discussing that project, and a number of the ideas presented in this paper had their
genesis in those sessions. I am very much in their debt. Some ideas had their genesis
in discussions with William B. Eldridge, Director of Research, Federal Judicial
Center, when we were colleagues at the Federal Judicial Center. I am grateful to him
as well. I am also indebted to my colleague Stephen B. Burbank, a constant source of
stimulation and helpful criticism, and to Craig Miller-Barnett and Chad Eisenberger,
able research assistants. Any errors, of fact or of judgment, are to be debited to me
alone.
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1992).
2 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The purpose of the bill was "to
provide for civil justice expense and delay reduction plans [and] to authorize judicial
positions for the courts of appeals and district courts." Id. at 1.
3 Id.
4 See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 202(a), 203(a),
204(c), 104 Stat. 5098, 5098-5101 (1990). These included eleven judgeships on the
courts of appeals, 61 on the district courts, and thirteen temporary judgeships. Id.
Authorizing the judgeships is a small, but important step towards alleviating the
shortage. For a discussion of judicial vacancies, see infra note 35.
5 See, e.g., Francis Kirkham et al., Colloquy on Complex Litigation, 1981 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 741, 747 (discussing problems presented by complex litigation). "[I]f more is
not done to reduce the expense of litigation, the legal profession will be destroyed. If
the courts of this country cannot handle litigation at a reasonable expense, then some
substitute mechanism for dispute settling will be needed." Id.; see also A. Leo Levin &
Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERaS L. REV. 219, 220
(1985). "Even litigators who frankly admitted that they were becoming wealthy pri-
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view of the sponsors of the legislation, altogether inadequate, as
the "worsening plague" demonstrated.
The authors of the CJRA determined that, if the legislation
was to have any measure of success, it must deal in specifics. The
tone is set in the statement of the CJRA's purposes. The CJRA
seeks "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the
merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and
ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil dis-
putes."7 This is to be accomplished by requiring each United
States District Court to implement a "civil justice delay and ex-
pense reduction plan,"' after consulting with a local advisory
group representing users of the court.9
The scores of CJRA sections and subsections that follow are
devoted to what Congress considers effective components of delay
reduction programs. 1° These are techniques and principles that
all district courts must consider and that some are mandated to
implement. In addition, there is provision for "appellate" review of
the plans that are promulgated.11
It is easy to take a narrow view of the CJRA, focusing exclu-
sively on case management techniques and assessing its signifi-
cance in those terms. Indeed, Professor Linda Mullenix recently
complained that "almost everyone who has considered the Act has
marily because of fees attributable to discovery expressed amazement and concern
about the rapid escalation of the expense of conducting and complying with discov-
ery." Id. (quoting Wayne Brazil, Views from the Frontlines: Observations by Chicago
Lawyers about the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 233-34).
6 See, e.g., 85 F.R.D. 521, 522-23 (1980). Justice Powell, finding that the 1980
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inadequate in dealing with
the problems of discovery, dissented from an order of the Supreme Court forwarding
to Congress those amendments. Id. at 523. "Favorable Congressional action on these
amendments will create complacency and encourage inertia. Meanwhile, the discov-
ery Rules will continue to deny justice to those least able to bear the burdens of delay,
escalating legal fees, and rising court costs." Id. These amendments were followed by
the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules.
7 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1992). This section of the CJRA characterizes the objectives of
the plans to be implemented by each district court. Cf Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United":
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 105 (1991) ( noting
that CJRA reaches beyond individual plans).
8 28 U.S.C. § 471.
9 See id. § 472(a). The advisory group will be appointed by the chief judge after
consultation with other judges of the court. Id. It will be balanced to include attorneys
and other patrons of the court who are representatives of major categories of litigants
in each court. Id.
10 Id. § 473.
11 See id. § 474.
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mistakenly focused on the nuts and bolts."12 Examining the "nuts
and bolts" is not an unworthy enterprise, and it is completely rea-
sonable that case management techniques be the focus of atten-
tion. The primary purpose of the CJRA is to guide district courts
in the implementation of practices and procedures to reduce litiga-
tion expense and delay.'" Indeed, this is the source of much of the
bitter opposition by federal judges who argue that the CJRA is far
too intrusive.' 4 These judges have added that the positive aspects
of the legislation were better left to implementation by the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States.'5
Any legislation that has ninety-four district courts busily in-
volved in "a nationwide experiment aimed at reducing expense
and delay in the civil justice system"'6 is of major importance, and
if the focus of the experimentation is improving access to justice,
the potential impact can be enormous. Moreover, this vast pro-
gram of experimentation may well yield useful conclusions which
enhance our understanding of civil litigation.
Notwithstanding all of this, viewing the CJRA as legislation
concerned solely with the details of the litigation process would be
unduly narrow. Likewise, it would be far too narrow to read it as
being concerned only with how judges process their civil caseloads.
It is important not to lose sight of the other provisions of the CJRA
which involve the other two branches of government and such pri-
vate players as litigants, attorneys, and "independent" research
organizations. 17 Each is too important to be overshadowed by the
"immediate-action-required" provisions of what is still popularly
12 Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MMNN.
L. REv. 375, 379 (1992).
13 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 472, 475.
14 See Avern Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts,
54 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROBS. 99, 100 (1991). Judge Cohn argues that the "Act man-
dates an extensive revision in the manner in which federal district court judges man-
age cases on their dockets." Id. Judge Cohn also suggests that the bill is premised on
invalid assumptions. Id. at 101.
15 Id. at 100. Moreover, the proposed changes in court administration do not fol-
low recommendations of the Judicial Conference which are based on carefully consid-
ered statistics. Id.
16 See Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49
(1992).
17 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 478(b).
19931
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known as the "Biden Bill."18 These "other" provisions are also re-
markable although they have been little remarked.
Finally, we must ask whether, taken as a whole, the CJRA
has larger implications for the future of federal procedure and the
entire rule making process. Professor Tobias, in a thoughtful, de-
tailed study of the CJRA and its implementation to date, notes a
serious threat to the "integrity of federal civil procedure."19 Profes-
sor Mullenix further argues that "the Act has effected a revolu-
tionary redistribution of the procedural rulemaking power from
the federal judicial branch to the legislative branch."20 These are
respected scholars whose concerns command attention. Is there
something in the structure of the CJRA, its unexpressed major
premises, or in the cumulative impact of its detailed prescriptions
that provide a basis for these views?
This Article shall briefly examine the implications of three
provisions of the statute that neither prescribe nor suggest spe-
cific techniques of cost or delay reduction. The first is a legislative
finding that "Congress and the executive branch share responsi-
bility for cost and delay in civil litigation."21 Is this conclusion no
more than a courtesy bow to the judiciary, assuring the judges
that others also share in the blame, or does the legislation envi-
sion remedial steps to be taken by the other branches?
Second, we must note those provisions assigning the district
courts the obligation, and the authority, to develop local plans to
achieve the twin goals of the legislation, more efficient and more
economical disposition of litigation. 22 As already noted, these pro-
visions are fundamental to the structure of the statute. Are they
intended to empower the ninety-four district courts to deviate at
18 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is widely referred to as the "Biden Bill," in
recognition of its principal sponsor Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
19 Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Proce-
dure, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1393, 1427 (1992).
20 Mullenix, supra note 12, at 379. Professor Mullenix contends that "Congress
has taken procedural rulemaking power away from the judges and their expert advi-
sors and delegated it to local lawyers." Id. Literally, this appears to be a gross exag-
geration, for the power to promulgate a plan rests with the judges of the district
courts. They remain free to accept or reject proposals made by the advisory groups.
21 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(2), 104 Stat.
5089, 5089 (1990). This discussion refers to the role of the executive as one of the
three branches of government, not to its role as a major litigator in the federal courts.
As to the latter, see Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1521 (1993).
22 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 472(a), 473 (1992).
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will from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules")?
If so, what shall become of the Federal Rules? Are we embarking
on a process of balkanization that will make a relic of the idea of a
uniform national procedure?23
Finally, the CJRA requires that the experiences of the ten pi-
lot courts and a comparable group of ten other federal district
courts be the subject of a "study conducted by an independent or-
ganization with expertise in the area of Federal court manage-
ment."24 This is one of a number of interrelated provisions relat-
ing to empirical studies that are to be reported to Congress.25 Do
they have any significance beyond the call for periodic checkups?
I. REsPoNsIBILTrIEs OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESS
Among the congressional findings with which the CJRA opens
is the statement that "Congress and the executive branch, share
responsibility" with the courts, litigants, and litigants' attorneys
for "cost and delay in civil litigation and its impact on access to the
courts, adjudication of cases on the merits, and the ability of the
civil justice system to provide proper and timely judicial relief for
aggrieved parties."26 This conclusion is neither in the version of
the bill introduced on January 25, 1990, nor in the version intro-
duced on May 17, 1990. Moreover, careful examination of the
findings reveals a dramatic change in tone from the earliest ver-
sion to the bill as enacted. The first version condemned the civil
justice system for failing to meet its most fundamental objective-
fair adjudication dispensed promptly and inexpensively.2 7 As en-
acted, the bill recognizes that obligations imposed by others, spe-
cifically the executive and legislative branches, may be at the root
of the problem.28 This external pressure is best exemplified by the
assertion that "[t]he problems of cost and delay in civil litigation
... must be addressed in the context of the full range of demands
23 See Tobias, supra note 19.
24 Civil Justice Reform Act § 105(c)(1).
25 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 479(a) (mandating that "comprehensive report on all
plans received" be made by Judicial Conference); Civil Justice Reform Act § 104(c), (d)
(requiring that study and report of demonstration program be made by Judicial Con-
ference); see also Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 205, 104 Stat.
5098, 5103-04 (1990) (study by Comptroller General of United States of "policies, pro-
cedures and methodologies used by the Judicial Conference" in recommending new
judgeships). These are to be transmitted to Congress.
26 Civil Justice Reform Act § 102(2).
27 See S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 ( 1990).
28 Id.
19931 881
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made on the court's resources by both civil and criminal
matters."29
The change in tone reflected by these developments is mir-
rored in the Senate hearings. Early exchanges between repre-
sentatives of the judiciary and sponsors of the legislation can only
be described as acrimonious. Both bitter and unrestrained com-
ments were allowed to remain in the published transcript.3 0 For-
tunately, over the course of a year, an accommodation was
achieved, which resulted in the findings discussed above.
If legislative findings are no more than window dressing,
mere "preliminaries" dictated by custom, we might have nothing
more than a minor historical vignette. These findings, however,
were carefully crafted and intended to relate to the substance of
the CJRA. The operative portion of the CJRA calls upon each advi-
sory group to identify the causes of delay in its district,3 ' and the
findings make it clear that the contributions of the executive and
Congress deserve inclusion where applicable. 2
The most obvious and most serious causes of delay attributa-
ble to the executive and legislative branches of government are a
shortage of human resources, specifically judges, and a shortage of
judgeships. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a district
court which had nineteen authorized positions during the period
in question, but lost as a result of vacancies over a five-year pe-
riod the equivalent of nine judges, each sitting on the bench for a
full year.34
The immediate reaction of most people is to compute the per-
centage loss on a linear basis, for example, twenty-four months of
vacancies out of 240 judge-months authorized. This computation,
however, substantially understates the harm. It is universally
agreed that a firm trial date, if feasible, is the most potent catalyst
29 CJRA § 102(1).
30 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 349 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings]. "I was
shocked to read some of the statements .... some outrageous things .... If my staff
did that to me, they would either be fired.. . ." Id. The bill was also noted as being
.extraordinarily intrusive into the internal workings of the Judicial Branch ....
Many thoughtful Federal judges are very, very uneasy .... Id. at 221.
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(C) (1992).
32 See CJRA § 102(3).
33 CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF PA. (1991) [hereinaf-




of settlements and, hence, one of the most important instruments
of calendar control. Unfortunately, a vacancy rate of even ten per-
cent can make trial dates exponentially less firm and unreliable
when compounded by an unpredictable and increasing criminal
caseload.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania is hardly unique,3 5 nor
is the problem confined to the federal trial courts.36 Particularly
35 See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the United States, Civil Justice Reform Act
Report, June 1, 1992 (covering early implementation districts and pilot courts). The
report covers the following districts: Alaska, E.D. Cal., S.D. Cal., Del., S.D. Fla., ll.,
Mass., E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y., N.D. Ohio, and S.D. Tex. Id. By late 1992, the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts listed a hundred judicial vacancies, 84 in the district
courts and 16 in the courts of appeals. See Diane Russell, Note, Some Ethical Consid-
erations of Judicial Vacancies: A Case Study of the Federal Court System in the
United States Virgin Islands, 5 GEO. J. oF LEGAL ETmcs 697 (1992) ('"e Administra-
tive Office.. . has called eleven courts judicial emergencies'-seats that have been
empty for more than eighteen months.").
36 See, e.g., A striking example at the appellate level is found in the order of Chief
Judge Clark of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which declared an emer-
gency under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b). The order begins as follows:
This court is authorized to have 17 judges in regular active service. Today,
the number ofjudges so serving is 13. Only one nomination has been sent to
the Senate for its advice and consent. It is now pending in the Senate. The
circuit is experiencing increases in appellate filings greater than those ex-
perienced in any other United States court of appeals. Because of the back-
log of cases in district courts of the Fifth Circuit, this disproportionate in-
crease in filings is expected to continue. Since the beginning of 1985, except
for very brief periods in 1986 and 1990, this court has been at least two
judges short of its authorized complement ofjudges in regular active service.
Retirements, a resignation, and the failure of the President to nominate per-
sons to fill vacancies in the court have caused the present increase in the
number of vacancies.
From all indications, such executive inaction may contribute for an in-
definite time in the future. Pleas for help have gone unanswered.
Lack of action to fill these vacancies, coupled with filing increases, have
caused a judicial emergency in the court. The effect of the declared emer-
gency is that cases may be heard by panels on which a majority of the judges
are not members of that court, i.e. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. Obviously, this has significant impact on the precedential value of
the decisions rendered as well as on litigant satisfaction.
Id. As will be discussed more fully below, acute shortage of adequate judicial re-
sources frequently results from three related phenomena: first, the failure to fill va-
cancies; second, the process of creating new judgeships (typically by omnibus bills
long in coming which add a substantial number ofjudges at one time); and finally, the
high level of demonstrated need viewed as the minimum for considering new
positions.
The problems are not novel. Consider the following excerpt from the final report
of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, often referred
to as the Hruska Commission after its chairman, Senator Roman L. Hruska:
1993]
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shocking is the experience of the District of the Virgin Islands.3
The extended vacancy period has forced this district to sustain it-
self by a steady stream of visiting judges, including an acting chief
judge.38 The CJRA, by its terms, requires the various advisory
groups to identify those vacancies that cause expense and delay in
civil litigation, particularly when vacancies are the chief cause of
that expense and delay.3 9 Clearly, however, relief is not in the
hands of the judiciary.
A related phenomenon is the delay in creating judgeships.
Again, the Report of the Advisory Group of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania provides a typical example. Between 1980 and
1990, there was more than an eighty percent annual increase in
the number of cases commenced.40 Only four additional judge-
ships were created during this period, all in December of 1990. As
of August 1, 1991, the date of the Report, none had been filled.
Inevitably, this data raises a difficult and troubling question.
If the courts have been able to cope, and indeed to achieve impres-
sive records of timely dispositions, without the necessary re-
sources, are the requested resources really necessary? If no addi-
tional judges are provided should not productivity be expected to
rise again?
If judicial dispositions were widgets and courts were widget
factories, the analysis might be easier. They are not. This is not
to deny that docket pressures sometimes produce desirable effi-
ciencies, for example, dispositions without elaborate, published
The heart of the Commission's proposal [concerning assuring adequate num-
bers of judges] is the creation of additional judgeships to meet developing
needs. A newly created judgeship which is not filled provides no help; by the
same token, a vacancy in an existing judgeship exacerbates the need. The
Commission recommends that judicial vacancies be filled expeditiously.
Such a recommendation may appear superfluous, but the fact remains that
in the last five fiscal years, vacancies in the courts of appeals have caused a
combined loss of twenty-eight years of judicial service. In a system with only
97 active judgeships, the effective dispensation of justice must suffer from a
loss of this magnitude.
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Inter-
nal Procedures: Proposals for Change 63 (1975).
37 See Russell, supra note 35, at 699.
38 Id. at 698-99. "Since 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
been forced to shuttle judges to the Virgin Islands from all over the country .... The
judicial caseload has grown to monstrous proportions." Id. at 699.
39 See 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(C).
40 See CJRA REPORT, E. DIST. OF PA., supra note 33, at 195.
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opinions. There are some limitations, however, which should be
noted.
First, increased productivity may not be without cost. For
some time, there has been a concerted effort to increase the
number of settlements and reduce the incidence of trials, with im-
pressive effects on disposition rates. This can greatly benefit liti-
gants as well as the system. Mr. Justice Brennan, while sitting on
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, observed that "a case settled is
a case best disposed of, because then one of the parties certainly
avoids the heartache of losing at the trial."4 - If, however, settle-
ments are achieved because parties are told that the priority of
the criminal docket and the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act
are likely to preclude civil trials for at least two years, productiv-
ity statistics may improve, but justice will hardly have been
achieved.
Second, and perhaps more to the point, the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States will not request an additional judgeship
until the weighted caseload in the district exceeds 400 filings per
year.42 This benchmark is hardly de minimis, particularly when
"early and ongoing control of the pretrial process" by a judicial of-
ficer is expected to become the norm.43
Apparently, the impact of a shortage of human resources may
be far greater than that of the principles and techniques of litiga-
tion management.' Solutions, however, are hard to come by, par-
ticularly since so much of the problem is political. Moreover, with
all three branches actively involved in creating judgeships, and
41 Judge William J. Brennan, Jr., Remarks of Judge William J. Brennan, Jr.,
1956 PRoc. OF THE ATTY GENERAL'S CoNF. ON COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY IN LITIG.
78, 87.
42 CJRA REPORT, E. DIST. OF PA., supra note 33, at 192; see infra note 45 (discuss-
ing weighted case loads).
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2); CJRA § 102(5)(B). To gain some appreciation of the
significance of the "400 filings," it is helpful to cast the figure in terms of dispositions
per working day, with or without opinions, trials, or hearings. Consider further that a
250-day work year is considered normal and that many time-consuming tasks, from
selection of law clerks to attendance at judicial conferences, must also be
accommodated.
44 See Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is
It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 165-66 (1991). After criticizing proposals
for disclosure as an alternative to discovery, Mengler concludes: "[A] sounder ap-
proach, more consistent with the Federal Rules' commitment to merits resolution, is
to put down the rulemaking pen and to provide the necessary resources to manage
formal discovery effectively." Id. at 165. This, he suggests, can be done by reducing
the caseload or by adding Article III and magistrate judges. Id.
1993] 885
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two of those branches involved in filling vacancies, it becomes ex-
ceedingly difficult to develop constructive approaches to this long-
festering problem.
It is precisely for these reasons that the Advisory Group for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recommended that Congress
hold hearings on the process of creating and filling new judge-
ships.45 The court approved the recommendation, and the chief
judge transmitted it to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House.
Congressional hearings are an appropriate forum to hear the
views of all interested parties.4 6 Can they do more than rehearse
the thrice-told tale of litigants hurt by political inaction?47 The
45 Two problems in particular deserve consideration. The first is the timing of
legislation providing for new judgeships. As the example in the text illustrates, long
periods can pass without action, followed by an omnibus bill creating a large number
of judgeships around the country. This practice may also have unfortunate side effects
not directly related to case processing. There is reason to believe that creating judge-
ships "wholesale" may contribute to less than thorough investigation of nominees' cre-
dentials, both by the executive and by those in the Senate responsible for the confir-
mation process. This, in turn, may have been a factor in the substantial increase in
disciplinary problems in the federal judiciary.
The second problem is the standard for measuring the need for additional judicial
resources. Is the level set too high or too low? Should it be a function of other factors,
such as the utilization of magistrate judges? To deal with this series of questions it
is important to recognize that cases vary in complexity and in the burdens they im-
pose on the judiciary. A case seeking recovery of a defaulted student loan is hardly
the equivalent of an antitrust class action. In order to reflect these differences, the
Federal Judicial Center has developed a system in which each case type is "weighted"
to reflect its relative burdens on the judiciary.
Reference has already been made to the fact that Congress has asked the Comp-
troller General to study the "policies, procedures and methodologies" used by the Ju-
dicial Conference in determining the number of additional judgeships to request. See
supra note 25. This hardly obviates the need for, or the utility of, Congressional hear-
ings. On the contrary, the findings should be subject to the scrutiny of the academic
community, of litigants as represented by organizations of counsel, and of the judges
themselves.
46 See supra note 43.
47 See Varied Issues Delay U.S. Nominees' Confirmation, N.Y. TmiES, Dec. 16,
1991, at B9 [hereinafter Varied Issues] (focusing on delays in confirmation of federal
nominees, particularly judges, due to political strategizing and bargaining). The arti-
cle noted the problems of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York: "Seven of the 27 judgeships in this district are vacant. Three of the seven
vacancies have not been filled for more than 18 months and for two of these there are
no nominees." Id.; see Robert L. Haig, Judicial Vacancies and Procedural Reform,
N.Y. L.J., June 15, 1982, at 2.
After the Justice Thomas confirmation hearings, a Senate Task force was formed
to expedite the confirmation process. Varied Issues, supra. The following New York
Times subheading demonstrates the need for dispassionate hearings: "Senators and
Bush blame each other as posts remain unfilled." Id.
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Southern District of Florida has offered an approach that has far-
reaching implications. The judges in that district are asked to
give at least six months notice before taking senior status. This,
of course, is intended to give the President and the Senate ample
time to avoid a vacancy. Judges, as well as justices, have been
giving advance notice for years, but what is significant about the
Florida proposal is that it sets a standard-a judge is expected to
give six months notice.
Similarly, standards should be created for the submissions for
presidential nominations to fill vacancies. Furthermore, Senators
who have the prerogative of making recommendations to the
White House should be subject to time constraints. This delay is
not measured in days or months, but rather in years. Political
factors can help explain some of the longest periods. Indeed, per-
haps they account for the insensitivity to serious ethical issues
that can and do arise when delay is egregiously excessive, but they
offer no solutions.
It is suggested that at some point there should be a deadline,
if only to announce that someone-a Senator, the Justice Depart-
ment, the White House-is in default. Moreover, as history has
demonstrated, even the unwritten rules of senatorial prerogative
are subject to amendment, they may be changed in the interest of
the citizenry and as a result of considered and announced policy.
It would be naive to assume that congressional hearings, in
and of themselves, create a universal solvent that makes difficult
problems disappear. It is hoped, however, that legislators dedi-
cated to improving access to justice will recognize that the lack of
judicial resources is largely a result of the current process of creat-
ing and filling judicial positions.
The time for such hearings is precisely now, shortly after passage of an omnibus
judgeship bill.
As of the date of this Article, written in the fall of 1993, the Clinton administra-
tion has been in office for the better part of a year with no significant progress on the
filling of judicial vacancies. The problem is not one of two political parties at logger-
heads, although such factors can exacerbate it.
8871993]
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II. LOcAL PLANs, LocAL RULES, AND NATIONAL UNoORmITY
A. Questions of Power
A "cornerstone principle" of the CJRA is that reform must
come "from the 'bottom up.' "48 In this regard, the legislature fol-
lowed the advice of the Brookings Institution Task Force on Re-
ducing Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation,49 advice which was
echoed by distinguished leaders in the field of judicial administra-
tion, such as the late Judge Robert Peckham.5" The CJRA re-
quires each district court to fashion its own plan to deal with
whatever problems it perceives based on its own conditions.
Moreover, local advisory groups are to be comprised of users of the
federal court system who can bring their own experiences to bear
on the analysis of problems and the fashioning of solutions, and
who will ultimately be affected by the plans.5 1
What freedom is bestowed on the local groups and on the dis-
trict courts? Are there any constraints? May a district court ig-
nore other acts of Congress or the Federal Rules? Upon enact-
ment of the CJRA, these questions assumed immediate practical
importance in two regards. First, while the CJRA encourages al-
ternative dispute resolution, Congress has placed limits on the
number of districts permitted to experiment with court-annexed
48 S. JUD. COMm. REP. No. 768, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990); see Peck, supra
note 7, at 109-10.
49 THE BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL
LITIGATION, REPORT OF A TASK FORCE 11 (1989), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 30,
at 421, 437 [hereinafter BROOKINGS REPORT].
[Rieform must come from the "bottom up," or from those in each district who
must live with the civil justice system on a regular basis. The proper role for
Congress, we believe, is to launch this process with a mix of suggestions and
incentives .... Accordingly, our core recommendations allow each federal
court... to develop its own set of reforms ... within some broad parameters
that Congress would establish through federal legislation.
Id.
The author was a member of the Brookings Task Force. It was agreed at a meet-
ing of the Task Force that the published report would note, either in the text or in the
foreword, that not every member of the Task Force agreed with everything contained
in the report, a common caveat that does not appear in the published version. Id.
50 See Hearings, supra note 30, at 315. Judge Peckham served in the Northern
District of California. He was the Chairman of the Judicial Conference, Subcommittee
on the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 2, at 15
(citing Judge Peckhan and stating that reform should be decentralized so that suc-
cessful ideas on local level can be implemented on national scale).
51 See S. REP. No 416, supra note 2, at 14 (citing BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note
49, at 12, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 30, at 421, 438).
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arbitration.52 Does the CJRA supersede the earlier statutory pro-
visions? Second, the entire area of case management was rife
with potential conflicts with the Federal Rules; this was particu-
larly true of the rules governing discovery. Is the statutory re-
quirement that local rules not be inconsistent with the Federal
Rules now abrogated?53 At stake was the principle of uniformity
in the federal judicial system.54
As is so often true, action could not await definitive resolution
of the legal issue. As Professor Tobias reports, one court, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
"flatly proclaim[ed] that 'to the extent that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this Plan, the Plan has pre-
cedence and is controlling.' "55 Indeed, Professor Tobias continues,
"in commendable candor, the plan's author states that the 'court
recognizes that provisions of this plan,' including the section re-
garding the 'relationship between the Rules Enabling Act and the
Civil Justice Reform Act,' could 'ultimately be the subject of judi-
cial review in the Courts of Appeal.'" 56 Nor was the Eastern Dis-
52 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651(a), 658 (1988) (permitting certain district courts to au-
thorize arbitration by local rule in any civil action).
53 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988) (requiring all rules established by courts to con-
form to acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure).
54 See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniform-
ity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1999, 2002-11
(1989) (describing evolution of "uniformity debate" regarding Federal Rules); see also
A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 1567 (1991) (discussing potential of Rule 83, which provides majority of
judges in given district with authority to promulgate local rules as means of creating
"laboratories for change").
Unhappiness with local rules, particularly the fact that so many are inconsistent
with the Federal Rules, has spawned a veritable lexicon of vivid figures of speech
characterizing them. Over a quarter of a century ago Charles Alan Wright described
local rules "as the 'soft underbelly' of federal procedure." Comment, The Local Rules
of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011,
1012 n.6 (1966). Other descriptions have ranged from the prosaic to the poetic: a
"gross affliction," a "computer virus of indeterminate origin," "a plague," and "Wild
Flowers in the Garden." See Levin, supra, at 1568-69 (citations omitted).
55 Tobias, supra note 16, at 51 (quoting CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY RE-
DUCTION PLAN PUSUANT TO THE CIViL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, U.S. DIST. CT.
FOR E. DIsT. OF TEX. 9 (1991) [hereinafter CJRA REPORT, E. DIST. OF TEX.). Professor
Tobias also notes that circuit committees as well as the Judicial Conference of the
United States have a role in reviewing plans promulgated by the district courts, and
this review should provide a forum for resolution of these unresolved legal questions.
Id. at 53-55.
56 Id. at 51-52 (quoting CJRA REPORT, E. DIST. OF TEx., supra note 55).
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trict of Texas alone; "[niumerous districts" have acted as though
they had the authority to disregard the Federal Rules.5 7
Understandably, this view did not command unanimous ap-
proval. In a carefully-crafted opinion which received wide distri-
bution, William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel of the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts, stated that where there
is "a clear statement of Congress' intention to provide the courts
with additional tools to control expense and delay in civil litiga-
tion,"," as is true in the case of certain aspects of discovery, the
CJRA "expands the civil rules in these discrete areas."59 Where
there is no evidence of clear congressional intent, the mere pas-
sage of the CJRA, with its emphasis on local plans, does not ex-
pand the authority of the district courts.60
Those who argue that the CJRA permits local deviation from
the Federal Rules suggest that the CJRA provides blanket author-
ity for a revision of Rule 83 to allow for local rules inconsistent
with the Federal Rules. For them, the CJRA mandate that "courts
adopt local plans to reduce excessive delays and costs" provides
the necessary authority.61 Phrased differently, it may be said that
"[d]istrict Courts... are now encouraged by the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990 to find new methods of resolving disputes with
dispatch and reduced costs." 62
This reading of the CJRA is surprising because the legislative
history provides no indication that anyone contemplated this re-
sult. Furthermore, the provisions to build "from the bottom up" by
promulgating local plans do not lack significant meaning even
57 Id. at 51.
58 Memorandum from William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, to Abel J. Mattos, Court Administration Division-
CPB 3 (July 5, 1991).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1. "While it is an important purpose of this Act to encourage creativity
and innovation, it appears to me that Congress intended such approaches to be con-
sistent with the civil rules unless it expressly said otherwise." Id. More specifically,
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 would prohibit development of local rules inconsistent with the
civil rules." Id.
61 See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139,
143 (1993).
62 See FED. R. CIv. P. 83 advisory committee notes. The amendment to Rule 83
was forwarded to the Judicial Conference of the United States in May of 1992, but
was not forwarded by the Conference to the Supreme Court. See 146 F.R.D. 515, 519
(1992). The proposed changes to Rule 83 were recommitted by the Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Rules for further study. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text
(discussing amendment in greater detail).
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within the constraints of the Federal Rules. Examples are abun-
dant: "early and ongoing control of the pretrial process through
involvement of a judicial officer," "setting early firm trial dates,"
and "explor[ing] the parties' receptivity to... settlement."63
More needs to be said about the amendment to Rule 83,
which, it should be emphasized, was not forwarded by the Judicial
Conference to the Supreme Court and, therefore, was not consid-
ered by the Court with the other amendments which became effec-
tive in December 1993. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
proposed an amendment to Rule 83 which would have allowed lo-
cal rules to conflict with the Federal Rules for a limited time,
under limited conditions, and for purposes of experimentation.6 4
The substance of this proposal is not objectionable. On the con-
trary, its objectives are commendable. 65 It allows for needed ex-
perimentation on the local level. Data collection essential for
proper evaluation of experiments and approval by the Judicial
Conference of the United States after screening by the Standing
Committee is also mandated.66 Indeed, the revision of Rule 83
would control what Professor Tobias has aptly termed the "Bal-
kanization" of federal procedural law6v and would assure that any
"experiments" include data-gathering as part of the price of being
freed from the constraints of the Federal Rules. It would, if coor-
dinated with the requirements of the CJRA, provide far more in-
formation and guidance than is presently expected.68
63 See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a).
64 See supra note 60.
65 See Levin, supra note 54.
66 FED. R. Crv. P. 83 advisory committee notes.
67 See Tobias, supra note 19.
68 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482. The amendment to Rule 83 limited the effective pe-
riod to a maximum of five years, which is hardly de minimis. It would be imprudent to
provide for a shorter maximum. There must be time for cases to be terminated, for
data to be gathered and evaluated and, where the innovations point to the desirability
of change on a national scale, for that change to be effected.
Individual district courts are provided some limited discretion to experiment with
local rules confined to a discrete problem or procedure. For example, Federal Rule
26(b)(2) allows a district court, by local rule, to limit the number of depositions or
interrogatories, and Federal Rule 26(a), governing the duty of disclosure without re-
quest by the opponent, is subject to "override" by local rule.
Specific provisions of the CJRA concerning the duration and the cost of discovery
and the desirability of voluntary and cooperative disclosure support these proposals.
But surely the authority to delegate discretion to the district courts goes beyond that.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (allowing local rules to exempt categories of cases from
requirement of scheduling order).
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Notwithstanding the above, there is a question of authority
and power, and it is suggested that, absent amendment of the
Rules Enabling Act, such a revision of Rule 83 is beyond the au-
thority presently bestowed on the Supreme Court.69 With com-
mendable candor, the Advisory Committee and the Standing Com-
mittee have recognized the problem and explicitly referred to it. 70
Under the proposal, a provision of the Federal Rules could be ren-
dered null and void in a particular district for a period of five
years without prior approval of either the Supreme Court or Con-
gress.71 Of particular concern is the relationship between the
Supreme Court and Congress in the area of procedural innova-
tions since the history of that relationship has not been altogether
free of tension in recent years, as the legislation on court-annexed
arbitration attests. 2
69 See Levin, supra note 54, at 1585-86 (arguing that any experimentation of local
rules should be authorized by Congressional legislation); see also REPORT OF THE FED-
ERAL COURT STUDY COMMITTEE 81, 83, 85-86 (1990); Sweeping Changes in Federal
Judiciary Urged by Federal Courts Study Committee, 58 U.S.L.W. 2599 (Apr. 17,
1990) (urging Congress to extend statutory authorization for local rules pertaining to
alternative dispute resolution).
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 83 special note.
Mindful of the constraints of the Rules Enabling Act, the Committee calls
the attention of the Supreme Court and Congress to new subdivision (b) [ex-
perimental rules]. Should this limited authorization for adoption of rules
inconsistent with national rules without Supreme Court and Congressional
approval be rejected, [the Committee recommends approval of other changes
to Rule 83].
Id.
71 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
72 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1992). Court-annexed arbitration was introduced in
the federal judicial system on the initiative of Attorney General Griffin Bell early in
the Carter administration. It began operation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
for example, in February 1978, on an experimental basis. The legislation authorizing
court-annexed arbitration was signed into law on November 19, 1988, a little more
than a decade later. Id.
In the interim, when it became necessary to obtain funding for the program, the
judicial branch went directly to the appropriations committees, rather than to the
judiciary committee, which had "substantive" jurisdiction over the area. The program
as enacted in 1988 was still experimental, with a five-year sunset provision and a
requirement of an evaluation. The legislation also introduced a substantial number
of limitations, specifying, for example, the types of cases that could be sent to arbitra-
tion, the courts authorized to experiment with the program, and the limits on sanc-
tions that could be imposed by arbitrators. The legislation was processed through the
judiciary committees.
The sunset provision expired on November 19, 1993 without Congressional ac-
tion. However, S. 1732, extending the sunset date to December 31, 1994 was sent to
the President for signature before the end of November 1993.
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A threshold question deserves consideration: If every pro-
posed amendment must be presented to Congress and is subject to
its veto, then if Congress allows an amendment to the rules to
take effect, is there not, automatically and inevitably, congres-
sional consent? The short answer is no; acquiescence does not con-
stitute consent. The failure of Congress to override a proposed
amendment does not repeal a duly-enacted legislative limitation
on the rulemaking power. 3
Policy considerations reinforce the conclusion dictated by
technicalities. It is useful to begin by considering a range of un-
derlying attitudes concerning local rules, for this may aid in expli-
cating the Rules Enabling Act. It is no secret that many lawyers
with national practices are deeply disturbed by the proliferation of
local rules.74 Such attorneys vary both in the intensity of their
feelings and in precisely what they find objectionable with the
present state of local rules.7 - There is reason to believe, however,
that they are most unhappy with local rules that ignore the Fed-
eral Rules. 6
Posit that one such practitioner or member of Congress
states:
I can live with local rules that are inconsistent with other local
rules, but I draw the line at local rules that are inconsistent with
the Federal Rules. The latter are binding on all of us, judges no
less than practitioners. I am entitled to rely on specific provi-
sions of the Federal Rules. If local rules are designed to fill in the
interstices, let them do so, but they have no right to veto the Fed-
eral Rules.
This is precisely the position that has been adopted by Con-
gress. Section 2071(a)77 states unambiguously that local rules
"shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice
73 See Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions about Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 997, 1011
(1983); Levin, supra note 54, at 1583 n.59, 1585 n.68.
74 See Levin, supra note 54, at 1568-69.
75 See Levin, supra note 54, at 1568-69.
76 See Subrin, supra note 54, at 2016-17. Such local rules were already singled
out for criticism in what is commonly known as the Knox Committee Report. REPORT
TO THE JUDICAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL DIsTuac COURT RULES III
(1940), cited in Subrin, supra note 54, at 2016-17. The Knox Committee Report noted
that local rules have been unnecessarily repetitious of the Federal Rules, have laid
down detailed provisions in areas which were intentionally left unregulated by the
Federal Rules, and have, in some instances, been contrary to provisions of the Federal
Rules. Id.
77 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1992).
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and procedure prescribed under section 2072."" s When this stat-
ute was presented to the President, it was the President's decision
to accept or reject the statute, including the limitation.
Nothing short of a statutory change can provide the President
with the opportunity to exercise his prerogative to sign or veto,
weighing the absence of the consistency limitation as he chooses.
It follows that amendment of the Rules Enabling Act, or the crea-
tion of legislation which specifically creates exceptions, as the
General Counsel to the Administrative Office has advised, is re-
quired to allow for local rules that are inconsistent with the Fed-
eral Rules, even for purposes of experimentation.
There is more involved than a "mere technicality," even as-
suming that it is ever appropriate to so characterize lack of au-
thority. As already noted, there is substantial disagreement
about the importance of uniformity in federal civil procedure. 9
Encouraging experimentation in the interest of "perfecting federal
civil rules,""0 even with the resulting lack of uniformity, is highly
desirable under specified conditions. The legislative process,
through appropriate hearings, can serve to inform not only the
drafters of the statute, but also those charged with applying it, of
the factors which should be considered in implementing it. 8 1 We
have a need for smooth-functioning laboratories for change; this
process is intended to provide the best possible design. 2
B. Reforming the Rulemaking Process
The phrases "working from the bottom up" and "responding to
local conditions" have a nice ring to them. On reflection, however,
it must be clear that this is hardly the way to maintain uniformity
in a national system of courts. Even if the CJRA is read as requir-
78 Id. (emphasis added).
79 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507 (1992).
80 See Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted
Field Experiments, 51 LAw & CO=TMP. PROBS. 67 (1988) (suggesting use of controlled
experiments either on unrestricted national scale or in small number of federal dis-
trict courts).
81 See id. For example, the choice of districts in which to allow a particular exper-
iment to proceed in order to maximize the potential benefit and minimize disruption
should be a factor for consideration. See id. This does not minimize the substantial
contribution made by the Advisory Committee in the careful crafting of the conditions
included in rule 83(b).
82 See Steven Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legis-
lation, or Information?, 14 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 213, 219 n.35 (1981). Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, a preeminent authority in the field of rulemaking, is credited with popu-
larizing the term in this context. Id.; Levin, supra note 54, at 1581.
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ing local rules to be consistent with the Federal Rules, there is far
more to the CJRA than a mere invitation to district courts to "fill
in the interstices" of the Federal Rules. The very passage of the
CJRA, and the formation of ninety-four advisory groups, creates
pressure on the national committees to invite local variations.
The "balkanization" against which Professor Tobias warns is in
fact here. 3
How did all this come about? The shrinking of the country
and the proliferation of national practice might have been thought
to enhance rather than to denigrate the value of uniformity of
practice in the federal system. The simple fact is that the struc-
ture of the CJRA partially results from disenchantment with the
rulemaking process as it operates today.
One need only look to the literature praising judicial rulemak-
ing as compared to legislative codes of procedure to see how far we
have come from what was originally envisioned. The affirmative
goals of federal reform sixty and seventy years ago included na-
tional uniformity,8 4 simplicity to assure that procedure would be
the handmaiden of substantive law and subservient to the mer-
its,8 and, of paramount significance, responsibility for assuring
fairness and efficiency of judges who understood the workings of
the system and who could provide a rapid response by way of
amendment when there was a perceived need for change.8 6 These
were some of the positive goals, but there was also a clear desire to
avoid the politics of legislative log-rolling with procedural doctrine
as one of the logs.8 7
There is widespread agreement that all is not well with
rulemaking in the federal system.88 One can hardly speak of
83 See Tobias, supra note 19.
84 See Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1015, 1042 (1982) (noting ABA's concern with lack of uniformity over one hundred
years ago).
85 See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 274 (1989) and authorities cited.
86 See A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial
Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11 (1958).
87 Id. at 10.
88 See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1879, 1880-81 (1989)
(noting attacks on uniformity and "fears of arbitrary and unequal decisions"); see also
KEETON, ADmISTRATrVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, A LOOK AT RULEIAUNG IN THE
FEDERAL JuDicLARY, THE THRD BRANCH 10, 11 (1993) (identifying concerns with cur-
rent process, including bills introduced in Congress to "amend federal rules directly
by statute"); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 455 (1993).
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rapid response to a perceived need for change. Amendments take
years to process, engendering frustration and the search for alter-
native mechanisms. To a great extent this delay is due to the
many changes in the system, each made with good reason. We
recognize the value of an open process, ample opportunity for in-
terested parties to comment, and public hearings at which sugges-
tions and objections become common knowledge while there is still
time to comment and respond. We also recognize the need for
Congress to have adequate time to evaluate proposals for change.
The cumulative effect, however, of these and other refinements
has been to alter the nature of the process. Response time and
flexibility are not the only problems. A former reporter to the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee ("Advisory Committee") wisely
recognized the need to create lobbying forces to counter the special
interest lobbies and "to provide a constituency for the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its authority under the Rules Enabling
Act."8 9
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court either needs or wants
such a constituency. On the contrary, it has recently taken steps
to distance itself from the controversies surrounding proposed
amendments. Indeed, on reflection it seems clear that the rallying
cry is hardly in support of the Supreme Court, but rather in sup-
port of the rulemakers, and that the terms are not synonymous.
Of course, it is true that, pursuant to statute,90 the Supreme
Court receives proposed amendments from the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States and, in all but the rarest case, forwards
them to Congress, but it has long been assumed that the role of
the Court is a very limited one.
This became altogether clear in April of 1993 when the Court
transmitted a veritable cornucopia of proposed amendments to
Congress. Speaking on behalf of the Court, the Chief Justice
wrote in his transmittal letter: "While the Court is satisfied that
the required procedures have been observed, this transmittal does
89 Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JuDIcATUa
161, 166 (1991). Professor Carrington, then serving as Reporter for the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, was comment-
ing on Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 802 (1991).
90 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1992).
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not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed
these amendments in the form submitted."91
In a separate statement, Justice White described his concep-
tion of the very limited role of the Court in the rulemaking pro-
cess. For him, the Court's role "is to transmit the Judicial Confer-
ence's recommendations without change and without careful
study, as long as there is no suggestion that the committee system
has not operated with integrity."92 He set forth Justice Douglas'
view that "the Court should be taken out of the rulemaking pro-
cess entirely,"93 and it is not too much to suggest that, at least
implicitly, he endorsed that view.
Three Justices dissented from the amendments to the rules
governing discovery. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting statement,
and on this point he was joined by Justice Souter and Justice
Thomas. 94 What is relevant for our purpose is the standard gov-
erning review of proposals before the Court. Eschewing any at-
tempt to improve the proposals or veto them because of "matters
of expert detail," the dissenters found objections "ris[ing] to the
level of principle and purpose."95 Based on the views of these five
members of the Court, it is hard to find in the involvement of the
Supreme Court any basis for concluding that the process is indeed
satisfactory.
If we pause to examine the discovery amendments them-
selves, some of the reasons for dissatisfaction with the current
process of rulemaking become clearer. We have spoken of the de-
sire to achieve national uniformity and simplicity. The provision
for what is termed "mandatory early pre-discovery disclosures" 96
that is required by amended Rule 26(a)(1) is completely subject to
local rule.97 Whether there shall be any requirement of pre-dis-
covery disclosure in a particular case, and if so, what shall be re-
quired, may vary from court to court.98 In theory, ninety-four
91 H.R. Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (communication from Chief Jus-
tice of United States transmitting amendments to Federal Rules).
92 Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 104.
95 Id. at 110. Justice Scalia stated that it required no expertise to realize that
where revisions are so "breathtakingly novel" as those concerning discovery practice,
they should not be adopted nationally without prior testing. Id.
96 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee notes (amended 1993).
97 See id. It is also subject to being overridden by stipulation or by order of the
court in an individual case. Id.
98 See id.; H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 91, at 124.
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models are possible. As to simplicity, it suffices to say that the
text of those subsections in the discovery rules that were added or
changed spans over forty pages; when deletions are shown and ad-
visory committee notes are added the number of pages is more
than doubled.99
The time it takes to process amendments has been a matter of
concern. The Advisory Committee argued against postponing the
provisions governing disclosure pending evaluation of local rules
under the CJRA on the ground that it "would effectively postpone
the effective date of any national standards until December
1998." 100 While a major component of this period involves the
studies referred to, the fact is that ordinary amendments typically
take over two years from the time of public hearings, in addition
to the time necessary to develop and prepare them for public con-
sideration. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with a proposal that
has been described as "breathtakingly novel,"' 1 taking several
years to develop. Nor does that fly in the face of the judgment that
"[clonstant reform of the federal rules to correct emerging
problems is essential."' °2 There are amendments and there are
amendments, and nothing in the nature of things requires that
the processes appropriate for some be applied to all.
What is slowly emerging is the recognition that we may need
a multi-track system. There are many possibilities. At one end of
the spectrum is non-trans-substantive procedure, procedure that
would vary from one type of claim to another. 0 3 It has been hotly
debated with little likelihood of across-the-board acceptance.' 0 4 It
is, however, possible to have differentiated procedure with respect
to certain aspects of litigation, not based on the substantive na-
ture of the claim, but on other factors such as complexity. The
Manual for Complex Litigation certainly is a prime example of the
recognition that certain types of cases need specialized treat-
99 See H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 91, at 28-70, 203-89.
100 H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 91, at 124.
101 H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 91, at 110 (containing Justice Scalia's dissent).
102 H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 91, at 109-10.
103 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989) (responding to Robert Cover, For James Win. Moore:
Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975)).
104 Id. at 2068. "[This article] concludes that judicially-made rules directing
courts to proceed differently according to the substantive nature of the rights enforced
is an idea that has been wisely rejected in the past and must be rejected for the pres-
ent and for the future." Id.
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ment.1°5 The CJRA invites-and with respect to pilot districts re-
quires-separate management tracks for different types of cases,
with the district courts free to define the tracks in whatever way
they choose.10 6
There are other ways of differentiating proposed rules. The
United States Supreme Court has asked that proposals transmit-
ted by the Judicial Conference distinguish between amendments
that are controversial and those that are not. The latter might
well be accorded a different timetable with respect to certain steps
in the process. The prestigious chair of the Standing Committee
on Practice and Procedure, Judge Robert E. Keeton, has also sug-
gested that differentiated processes of rulemaking may be appro-
priate in certain circumstances.' 07
Revision of the process is itself time-consuming and should
not be hurried. Some adjustments are relatively simple, such as
the recent re-creation of an Advisory Committee for the Federal
Rules of Evidence.10 8 Others, however, are more complex. The
CJRA's grant of authority to district courts to ignore some Federal
Rules, albeit quite limited, represents a significant change, one
made over the objection of the judiciary. It represents the legisla-
tive judgment that reform by the rulemaking process could not be
relied upon. At the very least, the CJRA provides a compelling
reason for reassessment of the rulemaking process.
105 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION, SECOND (3d ed. 1985) (originating from
Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D.
351 (1960)).
106 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (1992). Some tracks may be defined by subject matter,
such as asbestos cases or social security cases, while other tracks in the same plan
may be categorized by process, such as cases assigned to court-annexed arbitration, or
more generally as "standard track."
Section 473(a) states that district courts "shall consider and may include" a provi-
sion for differentiated case management. Id. The ten districts, however, must include
differentiated case management in their respective plans. Civil Justice Reform Act
§ 105(b).
107 See KEETON, supra note 88, at 10-11. "Acceleration of the process [of rulemak-
ing], in particular instances, may be both feasible and appropriate." Id. This comment
was made in the context of Congressional by-passing of the rulemaking process and
may thus be limited in scope.
Judge Keeton also notes that certain proposed amendments which were ripe for
public comment on April 15, 1993, would, "if approved ... without delay" at every
point in the remaining process, become effective in December 1994. Id.
108 See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the
Rules, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 857 (1992).
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Clearly, the Standing Committee, the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, which provides the secretariat to the
rulemaking committees, and the Federal Judicial Center would be
essential components of this enterprise. Congress, too, has be-
come increasingly involved in rulemaking and should participate
in any process of evaluation and reform. Lawyers and litigants, as
well as the executive branch, are interested parties whose contri-
butions must be acknowledged. What emerges is the classic model
of a commission, appropriately staffed and charged with develop-
ing proposals for legislative consideration, as has been urged by
Stephen Burbank."°9 If the CJRA stimulates this process, it will
have made a major contribution.
III. CAUSE AND EFFECT: SEARCHING FOR DATA
A. How and What to Study
The CJRA requires a substantial number of reports to be
made to Congress and imposes additional obligations on the Judi-
cial Conference, the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, and the Director of the Federal Judicial
Center.-10 Perhaps the most interesting of these reports is the one
designed to apprise Congress of the results of the CJRA's pilot
program. This program requires ten district courts, each selected
by the Judicial Conference of the United States, to implement six
"principles and guidelines of litigation management and cost and
delay reduction."1 ' These principles include: (1) differential case
management, (2) early and ongoing involvement of a judicial of-
ficer in the pretrial process, (3) careful monitoring of complex
cases, (4) voluntary exchange of information by the litigants and
109 See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, - BROOK. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993). Professor Burbank suggests a
moratorium on amendments to the Federal Rules pending the report of such a com-
mission. There is much to support this view, particularly when knowledgeable partici-
pants in the process find a need for political lobbying in support of pending proposals.
Whether or not all proposals for amendment should be put on hold, clearly an unhur-
ried study of the process deserves the highest priority. A moratorium could be ex-
pected to contribute to the quality of the study of the process.
110 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 474, 476-477, 479-481; CJRA §§ 104-105.
111 CJRA § 105(c). The statute also provides for a demonstration program, id.
§ 104, and for early implementation courts. 28 U.S.C. § 482(c). All district courts par-
ticipating in the pilot program or the demonstration program are automatically desig-
nated early implementation courts. CJRA §§ 104(a)(2), 105(a)(2). District courts
which are not involved in either of these two programs may also opt for early imple-
mentation and thus be eligible for additional financial resources.
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the use of cooperative discovery devices, (5) good faith efforts of
the parties to resolve discovery disputes without judicial interven-
tion, and (6) an alternative dispute resolution program. 1 12
Congress seeks "an assessment of the extent to which costs
and delays were reduced as a result of the program" from the re-
port in question.113 Moreover, this assessment is to be based on
empirical data gathered and analyzed by "an independent organi-
zation with expertise in the area of Federal Court manage-
ment." 1 4 Thereafter, the conclusions arrived at, whether they
support or tend to disprove the original assumptions, are to be re-
flected in amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
thereby applying the lessons learned to all district courts. In
short, the CJRA introduces a three-year experiment in the pilot
courts. 1 5 The resultant data are to be collected and analyzed, and
the Judicial Conference is to draw conclusions from the data and
apply them for the benefit of litigants throughout the system."
6
The effort to apply an empirical approach to innovations in
case processing must be applauded." 7 So, too, must the decision
112 28 U.S.C. § 473(a).
113 CJRA § 105(c)(1) (emphasis added).
114 Id. The Rand Corporation has been designated as the independent organiza-
tion. It is already engaged in designing appropriate studies for collection and analysis
of the required data. Presumably, the requirement of an independent organization
was to avoid the risk of bias or predisposition on the part of any individuals within the
federal judicial system. While the CJRA does not refer explicitly to empirical data, the
context makes it clear that more than impressionistic conclusions or subjective reac-
tions are required.
115 Id. § 105(b)(3).
The expense and delay reduction plans implemented by the Pilot Districts
shall remain in effect for a period of 3 years. At the end of that 3-year period,
the Pilot Districts shall no longer be required to include, in their expense
and delay reduction plans, the 6 principles and guidelines of litigation man-
agement and cost and delay reduction described in paragraph (1).
Id.
116 Id. § 105(c)(2).
117 See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 366, 367
(1986).
I am unconvinced by anecdotes, glowing testimonials, confident assertions,
appeals to intuition. Lawyers, including judges and law professors, have
been lazy about subjecting their hunches-which in honesty we should ad-
mit are little better than prejudices-to systematic empirical testing.... If
we are to experiment with alternatives to trials, let us really experiment; let
us propose testable hypotheses, and test them.
Id. (citations omitted); A. Leo Levin, Research in Judicial Administration: The Fed-
eral Experience, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 237, 241 (1981) (underscoring effectiveness of
research and evaluation, as distinguished from "rhetoric, exhortations, and advocacy"
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of Congress that, once the data has been collected, it shall be for
the Judicial Conference, utilizing the normal processes of
rulemaking, to implement whatever conclusions have been
reached. 118
It should be recognized at the outset that the data may prove
inconclusive. Comparisons among programs and among courts
may not yield results which have the clarity of a litmus test exper-
iment in a laboratory. Assessing causation can be a particularly
daunting task. Conducting a study with a similar group is a fa-
miliar and recognized technique. The CJRA specifically calls for
comparison with "comparable judicial districts for which the appli-
cation of section 473(a)... had been discretionary." 9 Given only
the words of the CJRA, however, the comparison may be between
two districts utilizing the same techniques, since a district which
is not subject to the mandatory requirement imposed on the pilot
courts may nonetheless choose to utilize most or even all of the
listed principles of case management. More significantly, the im-
pact of the omnibus judgeship bill on any given district will vary;
for example, change in any single district will, at least in part, be
a function of the extent to which the lack of judicial resources af-
fected the particular district in the past and the quantity of re-
sources (district judgeships and magistrate judgeships) now
provided.12 °
The difficulties, however, are not insurmountable. Moreover,
they are relevant at this juncture only to emphasize that expecta-
tions should not be raised to unreasonably high levels. What is
important is that the enterprise is going forward. The major
premise, that policy decisions should be informed by data, is the
crucial point. Whether we learn enough from the effort already
underway or will need to take another step involving random ex-
periments' 2 ' is of lesser moment.
in "improving judicial administration"); Walker, supra note 80 (calling for information
gathering before changes in Federal Rules are given effect). See generally EXPERIMEN-
TATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (1981) (discussing effectiveness of "program experi-
ments" in altering operation of justice system); Levin, supra note 54, at 1584 (advocat-
ing detailed "examin[ation of] the conditions under which local experimentation in-
consistent with the national rules should be allowed").
118 See CJRA § 105(c)(2)(B).
119 Id. § 105(c)(1).
120 See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5098 (1990).
121 See Walker, supra note 80.
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From a historical perspective, the provisions of the CJRA re-
quiring an empirical approach to improving the civil justice sys-
tem may prove to be one of its most important contributions.
B. Expanding the Inquiry: The Relationship between Cost and
Delay
It is commonly assumed, and probably with justification, that
delay increases the cost of litigation. We begin the analysis by
considering opportunity costs, that is, the time required to deal
with litigation, whether in responding to discovery or in making
decisions concerning the course of a case.122 These costs probably
increase as elapsed time increases, 123 and opportunity costs can
prove to be the highest cost of all. Moreover, the longer a matter
remains undetermined, with liability in doubt, the more likely it is
that a party's freedom of choice in the conduct of personal or busi-
ness affairs remains curtailed. 1
24
More commonly, when people speak of the costs of litigation,
the reference is to transaction costs such as attorneys' fees. The
corollary, that expediting disposition will reduce transaction costs
to the litigant, is, often assumed to be equally true, but it is far
from self-evident. Certainly, if a lawyer bills by the hour, long de-
lays by the judge in deciding dispositive motions can result in sub-
stantial time spent by the lawyer refamiliarizing herself with the
file, thereby increasing total fees. Similarly, extended discovery,
multiple hearings, and frequent in-person conferences make for
substantially larger fees.1 25 If these are avoided, the transaction
costs are likely to be reduced.
122 See Joy A. Chapper & Roger A. Hanson, The Attorney Time Savings/Litiga-
tion Cost-Savings Hypothesis: Does Time Equal Money?, 8 JusT. Sys. J. 258 (1983)
(suggesting areas where time is wasted in litigation). Long delays between different
stages of litigation (e.g. filing appeals and oral arguments) cause much time to be
wasted by attorneys reviewing the case. Id. at 260. This is compounded by frequent
continuances or the need for expert testimony. Id. The absence of limitations on the
amount of discovery conducted or the length of briefs submitted often results in "effort
that may have marginal utility." Id. at 261. Finally, time spent traveling to and from
the courthouse, and then having to wait once there wastes much time that could be
better spent. Id. at 262-63.
123 Much will depend, of course, on what happens during the additional period;
for example, whether the litigation is simply dormant, or whether the time is needed
for additional discovery.
124 Id. at 260-62.
125 See Peck, supra note 7, at 105. The Harris Survey, which was conducted prior
to the CJRA, found that the "high cost of litigation unreasonably impedes the ordi-
nary citizen's access to the courts." Id. at 107 (citation omitted). This was especially so
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Similarly, if a telephone conference call eliminates the need
for travel, the time savings may be translated into money sav-
ings. 126 This is true, however, only if the method of billing does not
change. If the lawyer continues to bill by the hour, but with fixed
rate minima for certain activities, then such savings may not be
realized. 127
When a lawyer is retained on a contingency fee basis, how-
ever, none of this applies. Extended hours do not increase the cli-
ent's costs, and curtailing the time spent on a matter, generally,
will not reduce the fee. 128 Nevertheless, even contingent fees are
responsive to market pressures. Typically, the percentage
charged will vary substantially, for example, between airplane in-
jury cases and personal injury litigation involving motor vehi-
cles.1 29 It is impossible, however, to predict at what point expe-
dited disposition will affect market rates.
130
The CJRA recognizes that the cost of litigation does not de-
pend solely on the courts, and that significant contributions must
ultimately be made by "the litigants [and] the litigants' attorneys"
if costs are to be reduced.13 ' The central problem is that we have
little data on what the courts can or should do to deal with the cost
of litigation.
in the discovery phase of the lawsuit. "The most frequently cited types of lawyer abuse
leading to high transaction costs are lawyers who 'over-discover'. . . and lawyers and
litigants who use discovery as an adversarial tool to raise the stakes for their oppo-
nents." Id. at 107-08 (citation omitted); see Chapper & Hanson, supra note 122, at
260-62 (discussing time wasted in litigation).
126 See Chapper & Hanson, supra note 122, at 262-63 (suggesting telephone con-
ferences could replace in-court hearing of pretrial motions).
127 See MICHAEL D. PLANET, REDUCING CASE DELAY AND THE COSTS OF CIvIL Lrri-
GATION: THE KENTUCKY ECONOMIcAL LITIGATION PROJECT 19 (A.B.A. 1984), reprinted
in ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY 278 (A.B.A. 1984). This was an empirical
study conducted on the relationship between cost and delay, a study of experimental
case management rules and procedures in two Kentucky circuit courts. Id. See gener-
ally Chapper & Hanson, supra note 122, at 258 (discussing how delay increases litiga-
tion costs).
128 See Chapper & Hanson, supra note 122, at 262-63.
129 See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without
the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 109 (1989). Over the past 25 years,
contingent fees in aviation accident cases have dropped "from the one-third level to an
average of fifteen to twenty percent ... with rates as low as ten percent noted." Id.
130 See Chapper & Hanson, supra note 122, at 262-63. "[T]he percentage of the
amount recovered varies by attorney [and] geographic region... [and] depend[s] on
the stage at which the case is resolved .... Moreover, the amount against which the
percentage fee is calculated varies, e.g., gross or net." Id.
131 CJRA § 102(3).
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It is doubtful that the research contemplated by the CJRA,
focused as it is on the effects of particular techniques and strate-
gies, will yield information adequate to guide the development of
policy.13 2 A broader compass is necessary. Moreover, these are
sensitive areas of inquiry, and study on a national rather than a
local basis is necessary. It would be appropriate for the Judicial
Conference, acting through its Committee on Court Administra-
tion, to take the initiative to assure informed decisionmaking 1 33
The CJRA has pointed to the necessity of judicial examination
of the problem of the relationship between cost and delay. More
fundamentally, the relationship between the cost of litigation and
access to justice is implicated. These are sufficient reasons for at-
tempting to learn more about the dynamics that drive the cost of
litigation.
CONCLUSION
Students of our system of civil litigation, and a fortiori those
who would improve it, cannot avoid continuing involvement with a
veritable mass of technicalities-the fine points of process and
procedure. They must, however, also be concerned with larger,
often more difficult questions, such as the relationship between
the cost of litigation and access to justice.
Are the tools we have fashioned to facilitate the discovery of
truth being used as tactical weapons in a war of attrition?134
Have we created an environment in which relative economic stay-
ing power too often becomes the crucial determinant in settle-
ment? As a whole, is access to justice being facilitated or
deterred?
As the CJRA recognizes, to achieve progress we must confront
both types of issues. As the CJRA also recognizes, it is literally
impossible for the judges of a single district court to do so in
splendid isolation. There are too many players in remote arenas,
132 Certainly, some data will be generated, if only opinions of lawyers and liti-
gants. However, we need to learn a great deal more concerning the dynamics of attor-
ney fees.
There were some of the opinion that the CJRA empowered district courts to con-
trol contingent fees, for example, by putting caps on them. Such a grant of authority
would have'to be statutory, and it is difficult to read such a grant into the CJRA.
133 See CJRA § 102(6). "[I]t is unnecessary to create an effective administrative
structure to ensure ongoing consultation and communication regarding effective liti-
gation management and cost and delay reduction principles and techniques." Id.
134 See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
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including members of Congress and of the executive branch,
whose actions impact directly upon virtually every facet of the fed-
eral civil justice system. 35
There is every indication that the judges of the United States
District Courts and the lawyers who practice before them have ac-
cepted the challenge put before them by Congress and are, in the
preparation of advisory group reports and district court plans,
complying with both the letter of the legislation and the spirit that
motivated it. It remains to be seen whether there will be a similar
response from the other two branches of government concerning
the delivery of civil justice in this country.
If they, too, rise to the challenge, if a more rational system of
assessing and providing needed human resources is implemented,
if a new and more significant role for genuine experimentation
emerges, and if all these developments supplement the essential
ingredient of a judiciary that continues to seek improved ways of
assuring access to justice, then the scope and sweep of the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 will indeed be both remarkable and
remarked. More significantly, its contribution may be of historic
dimensions.
135 This Article is not intended to be an exhaustive illustration of the sweep and
scope of the CJRA as it involves other activities of Congress and participants in the
litigation process. It has not addressed, for example, the obligation imposed on each
advisory group to "examine the extent to which costs and delays could be reduced by a
better assessment of the impact of new legislation on the courts," 28 U.S.C.
§ 472(c)(1)(D) (1992), a complex subject which involves the willingness of Congress to
listen as well as to speak. Nor has it addressed the obligation imposed on each advi-
sory group to "ensure that its recommended actions.., include significant contribu-
tions" toward reducing cost and delay; such contributions are to be made by litigants
as well as their attorneys. See id. § 472(c)(3).
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